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Abstract We examine the timing and quality of product introduction in an R&D 
stopping game, where we allow for horizontal and vertical differentiation in the product 
market.  We observe that discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as firms’ 
abilities as researchers change.  Further, when the research abilities of the firms differ, 
either the high ability firm or the low ability firm may be the first mover.  The underlying 
research abilities of the firms determine the social optimality of the entry patterns we 
observe.  Minimum quality standards and novelty requirements can play a role in 
correcting these suboptimal patterns of entry.  While minimum quality standards increase 
welfare for a large range of research abilities, we find that increasing the novelty 
requirement does not necessarily increase either the profits or, consequently, the research 
investment incentives of the initial innovator, contrary to much of the cumulative 
innovation literature.  Indeed, as the effect of policy interventions differs significantly 
across industries where quality improvement is steep and those where it is flat, targeted 
policies towards specific industries as are often observed in minimum quality standards are 
generally preferable to more broad-based policies.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper studies the effect of two policy instruments, minimum quality standards 
and novelty requirements of patents, on the timing of introduction of new 
products.  Both these instruments are pervasive in industries where new products 
are based on advanced technologies.  Setting and enforcing minimum quality 
standards for high technology products forms a large part of the work of 
institutions such as the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the 
Federal Drug Administration in the United States.  Indeed, bodies such as the 
British Standards Institute have literally hundreds of quality standards they apply 
across the gamut of industries from aerospace to information technology.1 
Minimum novelty requirements for patentability are present in most patent 
systems, specifying a minimum “inventive step”––or its equivalent—as a 
prerequisite for legal protection of new technology.  
Both minimum quality standards and minimum inventive step are costly 
instruments to create and maintain, with budgets running into the hundreds of 
millions yearly.2 As a result, it is important to understand whether and how they 
generate benefits.  A variety of rationales for each instrument have been proposed 
in the literature.  Minimum quality standards have been justified as mitigating 
information asymmetries that could hinder market operation (Leland, 1979 and 
Shapiro, 1983), and restricting the lower range of qualities offered by a monopolist 
attempting to capture surplus from a market (Mussa and Rosen, 1978).  In more 
recent support for minimum quality standards, Ronnen (1991) shows that, in a 
Shaked and Sutton (1987) framework with multiple producers and endogenous 
_________________________ 
1 See National Institute for Science and Technology website, www.nist.gov for exhaustive 
discussion of standards-setting for a variety of fields in the US.  These quality standards 
often refer to safety and some level of performance (equivalent to efficacy in drugs) for the 
intended purpose, but may also involve minimal environmental harm or other measures of 
“quality”.  We do not focus on the precise meaning of “quality” for consumers but instead 
simply assume that this characteristic is valued by them in some way.    
2 To put some rough numbers on this, the 2004 budget for the National Institute for 
Science and Technology was approximately $500Mm, including all its activities; the 
portion of the United States Patent and Trademark Office budget allocated to optimising 
patent quality and timeliness was projected at $2Mm for fiscal year 2009.  See 
www.nist.gov and www.uspto.gov.   
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(costly) quality, a minimum quality standard raises consumer surplus, the low 
quality producer’s profit, and industry surplus while only harming the high quality 
producer.  By forcing the low quality seller to improve its product, a binding 
minimum quality standard also leads the high quality seller to raise its own quality 
in an effort to alleviate price competition.3  Regulation of the inventive step as a 
“patentability requirement” affects the incentive to invent because it can modify 
the bargaining positions of different firms that participate in cumulative innovation 
(Scotchmer, 1996) and so can affect the division of surplus between early and later 
innovators.  It can also modify the effective length of protection of a patent 
(O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998) when the inventive step is defined as 
a quality margin that must be maintained between innovations in order to obtain a 
separately patentable innovation (and one that does not infringe earlier patents).   
O’Donoghue (1998) points out that requiring a larger quality “step” for 
patentability can result in research only targeting larger steps.  If these larger steps 
also take longer to accomplish, a more stringent patentability requirement comes 
hand in hand with a longer incumbency period and so increases innovation 
incentives.      
We study a one-shot “stopping time” framework where firms strategically 
choose their timing of entry and the quality of the product they choose to 
introduce.  The payoffs of our firms depend on both the quality level of the 
product introduced and the difference in the qualities of the products.  Such games 
have been studied by a series of authors, including Dutta, Lach and Rustichini 
(1995) and more recently Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005).  Our game shares 
with these earlier papers the feature that two types of equilibria can arise within 
this type of stopping game.  Both equilibria are characterised by staggered 
introduction, where one firm leads with a low quality product on which it earns 
temporary monopoly rents, while the other enters later with a higher quality 
product.  In the first type of equilibrium, the second mover earns higher lifetime 
profit than the first mover and, given the expected interval between the two 
_________________________ 
3 This result has been shown to be sensitive to the underlying assumptions on cost 
(Crampes and Hollander, 1995), preference (Kuhn, 2007) and the number of competitors in 
the market (Scarpa, 1998).  Note that quality standards have also been studied in the 
international context by Boom (1995), Herguera and Lutz (1998) and Motta and Thisse 




product entries, the first mover maximises its total discounted profits. There is no 
rent dissipation since the two firms do not compete to be first to market.  We refer 
to this case as a “stand-alone” equilibrium. There are also pre-emption equilibria, 
where there is rent dissipation and rent equalisation as firms “race” to move 
forward their entry date up to the point where they are indifferent between moving 
second or first.4  Because small changes in our parameters can change the type of 
equilibrium that prevails, there can be abrupt changes in the equilibrium entry 
times and profitability of entering firms for small changes in their (identical) 
research ability.  Indeed, whether firms “race” is endogenous: while the firms 
race—and so dissipate profits—when they are both highly skilled, less-skilled 
firms tend to settle into an equilibrium without pre-emption.  
We introduce to these models both the possibility that the firms may differ in 
their research abilities, which we define as the rate at which a researcher can 
improve product quality of a prototype, the possibility that minimum quality 
standards may prevent introduction of a product that is of too low a quality, or a 
patentability requirement may effectively prevent entry with an improvement that 
is too small a quality increment over what is already on the market.   
When we allow firms to differ in their research abilities, we find that there is 
no necessary correlation between research skill and either quality of the final 
product or the order of entry.  This result, which is broadly similar to that of 
Riordan (1992)’s study of the timing of entry, stands in contrast to Quint and 
Einav (2005) who adopt a war of attrition model to determine the order of entry.  
The crucial difference is that these latter authors do not allow the quality (and 
hence the profitability) of an entrant to improve with waiting: while a cost is sunk 
each period before entry, no gain accrues in exchange for this cost.  In our 
framework, the cost incurred during the waiting period results in an improved 
product that will eventually be offered on the market: costs, waiting, and quality 
are all tied together in our model.   While Argenziano and Dengler’s (2008) study 
of the order of entry and firm characteristics shares our intuition, their framework 
exogenously assigns profit flows to the entrants whereas we derive profits 
endogenously.  In both our paper and theirs, a “more skilled” firm has a stronger 
incentive to enter because it tends to have higher profit potential.  At the same time 
_________________________ 




it must balance this incentive to enter early against the fact that a less skilled 
researcher may still enter in the future with a higher quality product that will 
reduce the first mover’s profits.  If the low skilled firm tends to follow relatively 
quickly, then the high skilled firm may postpone entry, leaving the first mover 
position to the low-skilled firm.     
Without policy intervention, we find that the leader may enter socially too 
early or too late, and the follower may enter with either more or less than the 
socially optimal delay.  The pattern of entry tends to be related to skill levels.  
When both  firms are highly skilled in research, so that quality increments come 
very “cheaply”, the leader tends to introduce socially too early, while the follower 
tends to introduce socially too late.  In contrast, when both researchers’ skill is 
very low, the leader and the follower move socially too fast to market.  For 
intermediate ranges, the follower tends to enter too quickly, while the leader may 
lag or lead the socially optimal introduction date.  A minimum quality standard, 
which effectively prevents entry into the market before a given date, may or may 
not improve welfare, depending on which skill range prevails:  When research skill 
is symmetric and either very high or quite low, there always exists a minimum 
quality standard that improves welfare.  For intermediate ranges, this need not be 
the case.  In contrast to earlier work, then, minimum quality standards may not 
improve welfare when we consider their feedback effect on the timing of entry.  
When the two researchers are of differing ability the minimum quality standard 
has additional effects in that we observe that a minimum quality standard can 
actually change the order of entry.   As this can generate earlier participation by a 
high ability firm, this can improve welfare.  Unfortunately the minimum quality 
standard can also affect the delay between first and second product introductions 
in this case.  More precisely, when the more able firm moves first, a minimum 
quality standard can  constrain the date of entry of the second mover as the lower-
skilled firm will only be able to satisfy the standard significantly later than the 
more able first-mover.  As the difference in skill levels gets more pronounced, this 
effect becomes larger.  Hence, the welfare effect of the minimum quality standard 
depends crucially on the spread of research abilities of the firms, as it affects the 
order as well as the timing of entry.   
Since welfare is affected by both the date of first introduction and the delay 
that elapses between first and second entry, a novelty requirement is a natural 
instrument to introduce into this setting. In the context of our model of both 
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vertical and horizontal differentiation, consider the example of two products that 
are currently produced based on a large number of patents, and are currently 
manufactured and sold under different brand names.  The existing branding and 
design features of the products are taken as “exogenous” horizontal differentiation 
in our model.  The firms now contemplate introducing a new technological feature 
that will increase the quality of their respective offerings.  The impact of a novelty 
requirement on this new feature is what we study.  By imposing a minimum 
quality difference between first and second mover, a novelty requirement 
effectively increases the time gap between the two dates of entry, echoing the 
O’Donoghue (1998) interpretation.  We find that, like a minimum quality standard, 
the novelty requirement improves welfare when both firms are of high or low 
research abilities, with no necessary improvement over an intermediate range.  
Counter-intuitively, and in contrast to much of the literature on the effects of 
novelty requirements, when the equilibrium is pre-emptive, a binding novelty 
requirement decreases the profits of both firms, so that stronger patent protection 
is associated with lower profits for all firms in the industry.  The intuition for this 
result is very different from the recent literature on the negative effects of strong 
patent protection, however.5  In our case, the novelty requirement lowers the 
follower’s profit, and so reduces the “opportunity cost” of moving early for the 
leader.  As a result, the leader enters too fast with a very low quality product as 
part of pre-emptive behaviour. In other words, by worsening the prospects of the 
second mover, a stronger novelty requirement intensifies the race for the first 
innovation, dissipating rents.  Welfare can also move quite discontinuously as a 
function of the novelty requirement.  For example, as we pass from the range of 
abilities for which pre-emptive behaviour occurs to that where stand alone 
behaviour prevails, we observe a discontinuous jump in the welfare benefit of the 
novelty requirement.                                
_________________________ 
5 Papers supporting weak patent protection have ranged from those that assume costly or 
slow adoption which generates rents in the place of patents, those that allow other 
intellectual property tools such as trade secrets to substitute for patents, and those that 
generate excess research or a monopoly distortion when protection is very strong.  See 
Rockett (2010) for a survey.  In contrast to some recent papers that study patent strength in 
a quality ladder model with exogenous “roles”, we focus on endogenous order of entry 
rather than the structure of patent protection.  Again, see Rockett (2010) for a survey of 
these papers and other literature on the analysis of patent protection.      
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents the model and 
some preliminary results on the types of equilibria we observe in our model.  
Further, we show that the non-cooperative choice of introduction dates does not 
generally maximise welfare in our model.  We move on quickly from these, as our 
main interest is not in the baseline equilibria but the effect of the two policy 
instruments, minimum quality standards and novelty requirements, on these 
equilibria.  We consider the effect of the policy instruments in Section 3.  Section 
4 considers how these results change when asymmetries in skills are introduced to 
the model.  Section 5 concludes the paper.   
2 The Model 
Two firms (indexed by i = A, B) invest in Research and Development (R&D) to 
introduce their own version of a new product.  The quality of the products is the 
result of a game of timing.  Starting at time 0, each firm can conduct research to 
improve the quality of the product that it will introduce, qi, at rate θi per unit of 
time. Hence the quality obtained by firm i at time t is qi(t) = θit, where θi measures 
firm i’s “skill” in research.  Notice that we assume that firms cannot—
completely— resolve the problem of waiting by “throwing money” at the research 
problem.  One interpretation of this would be that we focus on research which is 
still at the stage where blind alleys must be defined and investigated, research 
questions must be honed down, or where clinical trials are necessary, rather than at 
the late stage where only final development and commercialisation must occur.   
Given their respective values of θ (which are common knowledge) each firm 
must decide when to introduce its version of the new product.  We make the 
simplifying assumption that each firm can introduce its product only once and that 
the quality of its product is fixed from the date of introduction on.  This allows us 
to focus our attention on the timing of introduction without dealing with the issue 
of “persistence of monopoly”.6 However, this assumption is also justified in 
_________________________ 
6 Dutta et al. (1995) examine “incumbency inertia” as a focus of their work.  Although one 
would be tempted to assume that an incumbent would enter late in a stopping game 
framework for fear of cannibalising its sales from an old technology, they show that the 
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concrete situations where further improvements are difficult once the basic 
features of the product have been “locked in”. For example, the single introduction 
assumption seems reasonable for the case of many drugs, such as anti-cholesterol 
drugs. As explained by Deibold (1990), the profitability of these drugs mostly 
depends on the quality of basic product first introduced by each firm, the following 
improvements having been of —relatively—minor importance.  
The demand for the new products is represented by a model with both a 
vertical and a horizontal dimension.  Consumers are uniformly distributed with 
unit density on a line segment of length 1.  The products offered by the two firms 
are located at the opposite ends of the line.  This horizontal differentiation could be 
thought of to reflect Rosenberg’s (1982) finding that different innovations within 
the same area tend to focus the needs of different user groups.  Each consumer 
purchases at most one unit of the good to maximize the following utility function: 
U = max(q–p–cx, 0) 
Where q is the quality of the product purchased, p is the price paid and x is the 
“distance” between the consumer’s ideal specification of the good and the version 
of the good purchased.  The variable c is the unit utility loss associated with such a 
discrepancy. Notice that, since every consumer has the same marginal valuation of 
product quality, there is a vertical dimension but there is no room for vertical 
differentiation strategies. 
In each period, the profits of the firms depend on the quality of the products 
offered and on the number of producers that have entered the market.  If firm i is 








=π  if cqi 20 ≤≤  
                  cqi −  if  cqi 2>
_________________________ 
incumbent may very well enter earlier because the entrant has superior ability to commit 
not to enter early. 
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depending on whether the market is partially or completely served. When both 
firms offer a product on the market, given the firms’ quality, firms set price non-








ctt −+=π  if cqqc ji 33 ≤−≤−  
         cqq ji −−                if ji qqc −<3  
         0                                if cqq ij 3>−  
The first line corresponds to the case where both firms have positive market 
shares. The second and third lines reflect situations where the quality differential is 
so large that one of the two firms monopolises the market.  Notice that, to keep the 
number of sub-cases to be considered down and unless otherwise stated we only 
deal with situations where the market is fully covered once both firms have 
introduced.      
2.1 Equilibrium 
In this section, we derive the basic equilibria of the model.  An interesting feature 
that will emerge is that industries characterised by lower research “ability”, in 
other words a lower rate of quality progress per unit time compared to the discount 
rate, will tend to be characterised by a larger difference in equilibrium profits 
between leaders and followers.  As we explain below, this stems from a change in 
the type of equilibrium that occurs in “low and high ability” industries.   
Each firm (non-cooperatively) chooses an introduction date, given the 
introduction date of its rival.  In other words, each firm must choose a date to stop 
increasing quality and fix the design of its product.  In solving for the equilibrium 
we assume that the firms cannot commit ex ante to their date of introduction.  In 
other words, we solve for the sub-game perfect equilibria of a game where—at 
each point in time—each firm that has not yet introduced its product must decide 
whether to introduce now or to proceed with further development.  
www.economics-ejournal.org 8 
 
We consider first the situation where both firms have equal “research” ability, 
so that they each have the same value of θ.  We first need to characterise the 
behaviour of the follower and then use this to derive the leader’s behaviour.  Given 
that the other firm has already introduced at time tj, the follower, firm i chooses its 
own date of introduction ti to maximise the discounted value of its profits. The 
profit function of the follower takes one of two possible forms depending on how 
long it waits before introducing its own product. If the follower moves fairly 
quickly after the leader, then the quality difference between the two products is 
such that both firms have positive sales. In that case, the profit function of the 












θπ if ctt ji 3)( ≤−θ  
 On the other hand, the follower can also decide to wait long enough that the 
quality advantage of its product ensures that it captures the whole market. In that 









−−= ∫ ])([),( θπ if ctt ji 3)( ≥−θ  
Maximising these profit functions, keeping track of the ranges over which they 
apply, we can describe the optimal behaviour of the follower as follows.  
 
Lemma 1:  Defining the optimal entry date of the follower as ti and the entry time 
of the leader as tj, the optimal entry time of the follower when firms’ research 
abilities are symmetric is given as: 
ti(tj) =  tj + (1/r) + c/θ  for θ/r ≥ 2.55c              
ti(tj) =  tj + (2/r) – 3c/θ  for 1.5c < θ/r < 2.55c    
where r is the discount rate. Hence, the delay between first and second entry, ti – tj 
is independent of tj. 
Proof:  See appendix. 
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The ratio θ/r is a measure of the amount of research progress the firm can 
expect per period compared to the rate of discount applied to that period.  The 
lower parameter restriction, 1.5c < θ/r ensures that the second mover is willing to 
wait once the first product is introduced, ensuring that the two firms never find it 
optimal to introduce at the same date. Since this is also the range over which a 
monopolist would find it optimal to enter with positive quality, we will assume 
that θ/r is greater than 1.5c for the rest of the paper. The limit that separates the 
two cases (θ/r = 2.55c), is a point of discontinuity at which the elapsed time 
between first and second entry changes discretely.7  This discontinuity is the result 
of a change from a regime where the firms share the market after entry of the 
second firm to one where the follower appropriates the entire market and becomes 
a monopolist.  We refer to these two cases below as “incremental” and “drastic” 
product innovations.  When the innovation becomes drastic, the single firm left in 
the market can act as an unconstrained monopolist.  In the incremental case, the 
firms remain constrained by each others’ pricing behaviour. 
The payoffs of this “stopping” game are illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b  In 
these graphs, the discounted profits of the follower decrease as the leader 
introduces later. This is because the follower can only start to build up an 
advantage over the leader once the leader has introduced, so that a later date of 
first introduction simply pushes back the time at which the follower can start 
reaping profits. On the other hand, given the optimal introduction delay of the 
follower, the profit function of the leader has a unique maximum at tS.. This profit 
function potentially takes  four possible forms, depending on whether the leader 
waits long enough that it finds it optimal to serve the whole market during its 
period of monopoly and on whether the follower goes for an incremental or a 
drastic innovation. However, given the parameter ranges over which each market 





























π   
_________________________ 
7 The profit function has a kink at the point of transition from incremental to drastic 
innovation, hence generating discrete behaviour at this point.   
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when the market is incompletely served by the monopolist and then shared with 
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][),( θπ   
when the monopolist serves the whole market but is then excluded from the 
market by the follower’s drastic innovation. In these three expressions, ti(tj) 
represents the optimal time of introduction of the follower as specified in Lemma 
1.  The determination of the date ts that maximises the profit of the leader, given 
the optimal further delay chosen by the follower, involves maximising a profit 
function made up of each of the three expressions above over the range for which 
they apply. The corresponding computations, and the parameter ranges over which 
each profit function applies are found in the appendix.   
Depending on the parameter range, two types of equilibria emerge.8  When 
research ability, θ, is relatively high compared to time preference, r, the leader 
finds it profitable to wait fairly long before fixing its design since the quality of the 
resulting product increases quickly at a low cost in terms of discounting. However, 
such waiting also pushes back the date at which the follower would be able to earn 
a profit.  This occurs to such an extent that the follower would, in fact, prefer to 
move first.  There is therefore a “race to be first” which leads to an equilibrium 
where the profits of first and second movers are equalised at tp. This is the 
situation depicted in Figure 1a.  
_________________________ 




                                  Figure 1a: Pre-emption Equilibrium      
Following Dutta et al. (1995), we call this a “pre-emption” equilibrium.  
Lemma 2 derives the formal expressions for the pre-emption times: 
Lemma 2:  For moderate research ability,  1.5c < 
r
θ

























































Figure 1b: Stand-alone Equilibrium 
For lower values of research ability compared to time preference, on the other 
hand, the leader may choose to move quickly enough that the follower is happy to 
move second.  This shown in Figure 1b, where the two curves intersect to the right 
of the maximand ts.  Hence, in equilibrium, one firm moves at ts and the other 
follows after the optimal delay specified in Lemma 1. We call this type of 
equilibrium a “stand alone equilibrium”.9  In such an equilibrium, the follower 
makes higher profits than the leader. Completely describing the stand alone 
behaviour of the leader, we have: 
Lemma 3:  For  “moderate” research ability   1.5c < 
r
θ
< 2.55c, we have a stand-













and for “high” research ability 
r







Proof:  See appendix. 
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Using these entry times for the appropriate ranges, we obtain the following 
characterisation of the equilibria of this game: 
Proposition 1:   In the symmetric ability case, if the research abilities of the two 
firms are limited (i.e., θθ <≤
r
c5.1  < 2.55c), then there are two stand-alone 





















2− , and the other firm 
introduces after the additional period defined in Lemma 1.  For higher research 
abilities (2.55c > 
r
θ
 ≥ θ ) there are two pre-emptive subgame perfect equilibrium 












 and the 
other firm introduces after the additional period defined in Lemma 1.  In each case, 
the two equilibria differ only in the identity of the firm that moves first. 
 
Proof:  See appendix.10
Indeed, numerical computations allow us to pin down a value of θ :11
 
Property 1:  The two equilibrium outcomes are preemptive for  2.55c > 
θθ =≥ c
r
804.1 , while they are stand-alone for 1.5c< θθ =< c
r
804.1 .   
Note that, in the propositions that follow, a general value θ will be used but the 
properties will refer to the value of θ derived in this property. 
_________________________ 
9 Dutta et al. (1995) label this a “maturation equilibrium”. 
10 For this, and Propositions 6 and 7, a shortened version of the proofs is presented here.  
Please see the discussion paper version for a more complete presentation.   
11 Throughout the paper, we will use the term “property” for results that are at least 
partially based on numerical simulations.  All other results are obtained analytically. 
www.economics-ejournal.org 14 
 
2.2 Welfare  
It is straightforward to determine the level of social surplus generated at each date.  





=      if cqA 2≤  
            
2
cqA −  if  cqA 2>
and the entire market is served if and only if .   cqA 2≥











+=  if cqq AB 3≤−  
             
2
cqB −                                             if cqq AB 3>−  
where both firms have positive market shares if cqq AB 3≤−  and firm A is a 
limit pricing monopolist if cqq AB 3>− . 














−− +−=+ ∫∫  





The firms’ non-cooperative choice of introduction dates will not generally 
maximise welfare (ie, would not be first-best).  Indeed, the inefficiency may come 
at the level of either the first or second mover.  Given the date of introduction of 
the first product, whether the follower moves too quickly or too slowly depends on 
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the research “ability” of the industry.  Specifically, if the ability is high enough 
that the follower enters with a drastic innovation, then the follower tends to 
introduce too late compared to the socially optimal date.  On the other hand, if 
ability is low enough that the follower only enters with an incremental innovation, 
then the follower will tend to introduce socially too quickly.  This is stated 
formally in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2:  Assume that θA= θB= θ. Given an initial date of introduction, tB A, 
and that the equilibrium is preemptive ( θθ ≥
r
) the interval before the second 
product is introduced can be either socially too short (for θ ≤
r
θ
 < 2.55c) or 
socially too long (for c
r
55.2≥θ ).   
Proof: See appendix. 
Indeed, when the equilibrium is stand-alone, the interval before the second 
product is introduced is socially too short: 
Property 2:  For θθ <<
r
c5.1 , we have:    .sBB tt <
The claims in Proposition 2 are due to two opposing effects.  On the one hand, 
waiting increases the quality of firm B’s product.  While this raises both social 
surplus and firm B’s profits from time tB on, the increase in B’s profits is smaller 
than  the increase in social surplus as long as firm B’s rate of improvement is 
small enough that both firms remain in the market following B’s entry.  This is 
because competition from the lower quality level places a limit on the surplus that 
B can extract from consumers and so allows some consumer surplus to remain 
with purchasers.  Hence, firm B’s waiting time tends to be too small compared to 





 smaller than tBs) because the reward to its research falls 
short of the full social benefit it generates.  On the other hand, waiting also 
postpones the introduction of B’s product.  This cost of waiting for firm B is 
12 For c
r
55.2≥θ , it is equal to the increase in social surplus. 
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smaller than or equal to the cost of waiting for society because, as before, firm B 
cannot usually appropriate the full social benefit of an increase in the quality of its 
product.13  This effect tends to make firm B’s waiting time too large compared to 
the social optimum (tB greater than tB Bs).  When research ability is high enough 
compared to time preference, firm B serves the whole market as a monopolist as 
soon as its good is introduced. In this case, firm B can capture all the social 
benefits of a given quality increase since individual consumer demands are 
inelastic.  This means that the first of the two effects discussed above disappears 
and the privately chosen waiting time of the follower is socially excessive when 
the second introduction represents such a leap in quality that it effectively 
eliminates the first product from contention.  For lower values of research ability 
compared to time preference, on the other hand, the first effect actually dominates 
so that tBB is smaller than the social optimum. Overall, then, incremental follow-up 
innovations tend to be introduced too quickly, while drastic ones tend to be 
introduced too slowly.14       
A second source of inefficiency is that, given the second mover’s optimal 
reaction, the first innovation can be introduced too early or too late, so that tA can 
be greater or smaller than tAs.  
 
Proposition 3: Assume that θA= θB= θ.  Given the second mover’s optimal 
reaction, the initial date of introduction, t
B
A, will be too early compared to the social 
optimum if the speed of learning is large enough that the second mover enters with 
a drastic innovation, (i.e. c
r
55.2>θ ).  For moderate research abilities, 
,55.25.1 c
r
c ≤< θ the first product may be introduced too early or too late.   
_________________________ 





14 Other models, cited in our introduction, of cumulative innovation have not exhibited 
this feature because of restrictions on the nature of competition, restrictions on the 
parameter ranges considered, or restrictions on the dimensions of differentiation allowed.  
Our model encompasses sufficient generality to allow this case to emerge. (although 




Proof:  See appendix. 
To be more specific about the ranges over which behaviour occurs in the lower 
range, we compute the following: 
 
Property 3:  When ,5.1 θθ ≤<
r
c the equilibrium is stand alone and the leader 
enters too early compared to the social optimum; when c
r
19.2=≤< θθθ  the 
equilibrium is pre-emptive and the leader enters too late compared to the social 
optimum; when 2.19c = ,55.2 c
r
≤<
θθ the equilibrium is preemptive and the 
leader enters too early compared to the social optimum. 
When the rate of research progress (or “ability”) is high enough that drastic 
innovation will follow, the leader’s date of introduction tends to be too early.  
Combining this with our earlier welfare results on the follower, we observe a 
pattern of sequential monopoly for this parameter range, with the first product 
introduced socially too early and the follower’s product introduced socially too 
late.  On the other hand, when research progress is very slow, both the leader and 
the follower move socially too fast to market, each with a small improvement.  For 
intermediate ranges, the follower moves socially too quickly, given the leader’s 
introduction date, but the leader may move too quickly or too slowly.   
3 Policy Instruments 
We have observed that there can be a deviation between the socially and the 
privately optimal entry date of both the leader and the follower.  We now consider 
two policy instruments that might help reduce this discrepancy. The first 
instrument, a minimum quality standard, can only retard the date of first entry 
since the quality improves from leader to follower.  It can therefore only be useful 
over parameter ranges where the leader enters too soon in equilibrium.  The 
second instrument, a novelty requirement, effectively increases the time that 
elapsed between first and second entry.  As such it is useful when the second 
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entrant moves too soon. However, the welfare analysis of the two instruments is 
more complex than this. By delaying the date of first entry, a minimum quality 
standard also delays the date of second entry. Similarly, a novelty requirement 
directly changes the behaviour of the follower, but this in turn also affects the 
behaviour of the leader.  
3.1 Minimum Quality Standards 
A binding minimum quality standard imposes a minimum absolute quality level 
that can be marketed.  For example, the FDA does not allow commercialisation of 
drugs that fail to demonstrate via clinical trials a minimum threshold of safety and 
efficacy in their claimed use.  This standard forces the first entrant (only) to 
introduce its product later than it would have wished to. The impact of such a 
policy over the range where we have a stand-alone equilibrium is straightforward 
for two reasons. Firstly, a binding minimum quality cannot change the nature of 
the equilibrium. By pushing back the profit-maximising date of first introduction, 
the policy further decreases the profits of the leader.  Since these were already 
lower than those of the follower, the equilibrium remains of the stand alone 
variety. Indeed, we already know that, over the range where stand alone equilibria 
prevail, the first product is introduced too early. We can therefore conclude that 
there always is a minimum quality standard that would strictly increase welfare.   
We now turn to the parameter range for which we have pre-emptive equilibria.  
This creates an additional technical difficulty as the policy can itself change the 
nature of the equilibrium: by decreasing the profits of the first mover it can turn a 
pre-emptive equilibrium into a stand-alone equilibrium. Taking this potential 
switch into account we find that there exists a binding quality standard that 
increases welfare if research abilities are high enough.  In particular, welfare 
increases when abilities are such that the follower would enter with a drastic 
innovation. These results are summarised in Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4:  Assume that θA= θB= θ. There is a binding minimum quality 




c5.1 ) or 





55.2>θ ).  For intermediate values of research ability, the result depends the 
level of research ability: for ranges over which the leader enters too early, it 
improves welfare; for ranges over which the leader enters too late, it cannot 
improve welfare.  
Proof:  See appendix. 
More specifically, we have: 
Property 4:  In the range θθθ <<
r
, the minimum quality standard cannot be 
used to improve welfare, while for ,55.2 c
r
<<
θθ the minimum quality standard 
can improve welfare. 
Combining this with our previous results, there is a relatively small 
intermediate range for which minimum quality standards cannot improve welfare 
in the pre-emption equilibrium.  For low or high research abilities, and for ranges 
over which stand alone equilibria occur, they do.   
3.2 Novelty Requirements 
Following Scotchmer and Green (1990) and O’Donoghue (1998) we interpret a 
novelty requirement as a restriction on the vertical scope of patents.  In other 
words, a follower must demonstrate a minimum improvement over another 
(patented) product to be allowed to exploit its own product commercially.  The 
effect of a novelty requirement contrasts to the minimum quality standard, which 
prevents introduction of any product below some minimum absolute quality 
threshold even in the absence of any other product in the market.  In the US, drugs 
that are patented are subject to standard novelty requirements on patentability that 
are administered and applied by the patent office separate from any quality 
standards imposed by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA).   
Our approach departs from the existing literature in that we do not assume that 
the innovations of the two firms are “cumulative” in the traditional sense of the 
term. Cumulative innovation refers to situations where the second innovation or 
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“improvement” would not be possible without the prior development of the first 
innovation.  There is, therefore, an exogenously determined sequence of 
investment, with investment on the follow-up innovation starting only once the 
initial innovation has been obtained.  By contrast, in our model both firms “race” 
from the beginning:  the timing of both introductions as well as the identity of first 
and second innovators are determined endogenously. This is still consistent with a 
novelty requirement as an interpretation, but it means that the order of entry is not 
“set” beforehand. As we will see, this leads to quite distinct conclusions from 
existing work.   
A binding novelty requirement has several effects on the equilibrium timing of 
entry. Firstly, it delays the introduction of the second product.  When we have very 
high research ability in the industry, this effect does not improve welfare as the 
follower already waits socially too long to introduce (Proposition 2). This occurs 
over the range where the second innovation is drastic.  In other words, the 
incentive to improve quality to the point of dominating the industry is so powerful 
that a novelty requirement is not necessary. Indeed, as incentives to wait are 
already excessive, any binding novelty requirement would in fact decrease both 
the profits of the second mover and welfare. It would however increase the profits 
of the initial innovator since it increases the length of its monopoly period.  For 
lower research abilities, in contrast, we know that the second product is introduced 
too quickly so that a novelty requirement can be used to increase welfare.  Hence, 
we cannot make a blanket statement as to whether “strong” or “weak” patents are 
good either for firms or for welfare in this model, as it depends on the speed of 
evolution of the industry to which we apply it. 
The effects that we have just described have quite different consequences 
depending on the type of equilibrium involved.  In a stand-alone equilibrium a 
binding novelty requirement makes the leader wait longer, as the value of any 
quality improvements can be enjoyed over a longer monopoly phase. Since initial 
entry occurs too early over this range, this effect improves welfare. It also ensures 
that—as in much of the previous literature—a binding novelty requirement 
increases the profits of the initial innovator and decreases those of the follower.  
The situation is quite different over the range where pre-emptive equilibria arise. 
Precisely because it increases the profit of the leader and decreases those of the 
follower for a given date of first introduction, the novelty requirement leads to 
faster introduction by the leader: starting from an initial equilibrium where the 
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profits of the two firms are equal, firms will compete to introduce even earlier in 
order to eliminate the discrepancy between leader and follower’s profits resulting 
from the novelty requirement. This increases welfare for intermediate values of the 
research ability parameter but decreases as soon as we hit the range where θ/r is 
large enough to guarantee that the follower enters with a drastic improvement. 
More notably, though, in a pre-emption equilibrium,15 a binding novelty 
requirement ends up decreasing the profits of both the follower and the initial 
inventor. Putting these effects together gives us the results presented in Proposition 
5. 
Proposition 5:  Assume that θA= θB= θ.  If B cr
55.2≥θ  or if 1.5c < 
r
θ
<θ  then a 
binding novelty requirement decreases welfare.  For θθ ≥
r
, any binding novelty 
requirement decreases the profits of both the follower and the initial inventor and 
speeds up the date of initial entry. 
Proof: See appendix. 
For an intermediate range, there are two effects of the novelty requirement— 
speeding up the initial date of entry and slowing down the second date of entry— 
so that the final effect on welfare is ambiguous.  We calculate the net effect in 
Property 5: 
Property 5:  For ,55.2 c
r
<≤
θθ a binding novelty requirement decreases 
welfare, while for θθθ <<
r
a binding novelty requirement increases welfare.   
_________________________ 
15 Starting from a pre-emption equilibrium the game will remain in a pre-emption 
equilibrium for any binding novelty requirement. On the other hand, a binding novelty 
requirement can change a stand alone equilibrium into a pre-emptive equilibrium. This 
technical difficulty is taken into account when deriving the results in Proposition 5. 
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The last part of Proposition 5 implies, perhaps counter-intuitively, that for the 
range over which pre-emptive equilibria arise, a binding socially optimal novelty 
requirement decreases profits, and hence R&D investment incentives of the first 
mover.  Making (patent) protection of the first innovation “stronger” does not 
therefore necessarily make the first mover better off, nor does it necessarily 
increase its R&D investment.  The intuition for the desirability of “weak” patents 
is that the novelty requirement can lower the “opportunity cost” of being a 
follower and so allow for the leader to pre-empt earlier with a lower-quality 
product.  This ends up being bad for the leader, but as the alternative of moving 
later is also less attractive, this worse alternative can still be the optimal choice for 
the firm.  This argument is quite distinct from previous arguments against strong 
patent in the burgeoning literature on weak patents.16 Another interesting feature 
of this analysis is that it indicates that welfare can move quite discontinuously with 
small changes in policy due to discontinuities in the behaviour of the following 
firm.  As research ability falls to the point where innovation is no longer drastic, 
the follower’s introduction time moves discontinuously from “too late” to “too 
early”.  This can discontinuously increase the benefit of imposing a binding 
novelty requirement.  Furthermore, the sudden disappearance of the negative effect 
of the novelty requirement on the first introduction as we pass from pre-emptive to 
stand alone equilibrium again makes welfare jump at this point in response to the 
policy.  Hence, even small changes can have quite a dramatic effect on the 
industry equilibrium.         
4 Asymmetric Abilities 
In this section, we comment on how our results change when we allow the two 
firms to differ in their “abilities”, θA and θB.  This can reflect the firms’ differential 
endowment of the human capital necessary to adopt publicly available technology 
B
_________________________ 
16 Weak patents have been found to improve profits and welfare under conditions where 
other frictions guarantee the profitability of firms (see Cohen and Levinthal (1989) for an 
early contribution in this vein) or, when added to frictions, weak appropriability can 
increase the chance of discovery, the value to final consumers and, hence, the profits of all 
firms that can capture this value (Bessen and Maskin, 2007).    
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or it can result from the fact that the different research routes which were chosen 
by the firms initially prove to be more or less amenable to quick development.  
Indeed, we could think of different abilities’ resulting from different process 
innovations that allow access to different technological paths.  In other words, 
while in the previous section we could have interpreted our policy instrument as 
changing the scope of protection on product innovation, here we could interpret 
our experiments as considering how protection of process innovations, which 
could result in differences in the speed with which developments can be made to 
products, affect our results.  The differences in process need not be thought of as 
patentable process innovations.  They could instead be differences in innovation 
systems or architectures within firms that allow quicker or slower progress in 
quality and are protectable by other means, such as secrecy.17
When firms have different levels of ability, the lag between the two 
introduction dates depends on the difference in ability between the two firms.  For 
the purposes of comparison with the symmetric case, we state the formal 
expression describing the follower’s behaviour here: 
 
Lemma 4:  The entry date of the follower, ti(tj),  in response to the leader’s entry 
date, tj, can be described as follows:   
                 For θi  ≥ 2.55cr               ti(tj) =  tj + (1/r) + c/θi + [(θj-θi)/θi]tj   
                  For 1.5cr < θi < 2.55cr   ti(tj) =  tj + (2/r) – 3c/θi+ [(θj-θi)/θi]tj
Proof:  The proof is not included as it differs only trivially from the proof of 
Lemma 1.   
 
Notice that now, when the less able firm moves first so that θj < θi, the follower’s 
entry date moves forward as its relative ability increases.  The follower’s entry 
date also decreases with its own absolute level of ability, so that a more able 
follower moves earlier all else equal. There is a discrete change in the entry 
behaviour of the follower when the ability level passes a threshold level.  At this 
_________________________ 
17 The concept of technological trajectories, put forward by Dosi (1982) would be related 
to this difference in innovation “routes” as well.  Also see Choi (1993), who develops this 
idea in a model of intellectual property rights and R&D competition.   
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point, the follower discretely increases her waiting time and introduces a drastic 
product innovation. 
In the pre-emptive equilibrium, just as in the symmetric case, one firm 
introduces first just before its rival would want to become first mover.  There is no 
necessary correlation, however, between ability and order of entry.  In other 
words, improving the research architecture in a firm need not imply that the firm 
will introduce a product sooner in equilibrium.  Indeed, for the parameter range 
where a pre-emption equilibrium exists, the least able firm introduces first when 
abilities are rather high whereas the more able firm moves first when abilities are 
rather low.  Hence, the effect on entry time of a firm’s investments in research 
ability depends on the level of ability that prevailed before the investment.  In the 
former case, the quality of the leader’s good must be lower than the quality of the 
product introduced by its more proficient competitor.  In the latter case, the less 
able second mover always introduces a product of higher quality than the more 
efficient leader in equilibrium in the second case, as only in this case can the 
discounted profits of leader and follower be the same.  Hence, while quality 
increases over time, the “intrinsic” ability of the leader may be higher or lower 
than that of the follower.  It is also the case that for stand alone equilibria, either 
the high ability firm or the low ability firm may move first, depending on the 
parameter values.  This is summarised in the proposition below: 
 
Proposition 6:  Parameter ranges exist for which the unique equilibrium is such 
that the most able firm enters the market first.  Parameter ranges for which the 
least able firm moves first in the unique equilibrium also exist. 
Proof:  See appendix. 
Allowing for differences in the firms’ abilities modifies the analysis of 
minimum quality requirements on two counts.  First, a binding minimum quality 
standard can change the order of introduction of the two products.  In other words, 
it can change the identity of the leader from a high to a low ability firm (or vice 
versa).  We illustrate this effect with the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 7:  If the parameter range is such that the lower quality firm enters 
first, then a binding minimum quality standard can reverse the order in which the 
two firms choose to introduce their product. 
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Proof:  See appendix. 
This effect allows the minimum quality standard to have an effect of 
generating relatively early participation in the market of a high ability firm.  All 
else equal, this will benefit welfare.  Unfortunately, and contrary to the symmetric 
case, a minimum quality standard now also affects the delay between first and 
second introductions.  Furthermore, the direction and magnitude of the effect 
depends on whether the more or less able firm moves first as well as on the 
absolute level of ability of the following firm.  When we switch the order of entry 
so that the more able firm moves first, the effect on the follower’s date, all else 
equal, is to delay entry.  Hence, while the minimum quality standard obtains the 
desired quality from a high ability firm, it does not necessarily increase overall 
welfare because it can delay improvements to that quality.  Finally, the initial date 
of introduction now enters into the expression for the delay in the follower’s 
introduction date, with a coefficient that increases with the difference in the 
relative abilities of the leader and follower.  As a result, a minimum quality 
standard, by pushing back the entry date of the leader, can have a feedback effect 
on the entry date of the follower.   
In sum, adding the effect of the minimum quality standard on both the leader 
and follower delays, one sees that the welfare effect of a minimum quality 
standard can depend crucially on the spread of research abilities of the firms 
involved, which firm moves first in the initial equilibrium without the policy, and 
the type of equilibrium that prevails.  In general, the overall welfare effect is 
unclear.  To illustrate, consider the case where the lower quality firm enters first in 
a pre-emption equilibrium.  Starting from a point where research abilities are very 
close to equal, let a mean-preserving spread in abilities occur.  This tends to 
decrease the follower’s waiting time (from Lemma 4) so that the pattern of entry is 
for a low ability firm to enter first, followed quickly by an improved quality 
offered by the high ability firm.  When we introduce a binding minimum quality 
standard, we reverse the order of entry, now having a high ability firm enter first, 
followed by the low ability firm entering with higher quality but after a long wait.  
One cannot, in general, rank the welfare outcomes of these two possibilities, nor 
can one make any definitive statements that a minimum quality standard improves 
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welfare overall.  Indeed, this is true of the novelty requirement as well in this 
framework.18        
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
We have investigated the timing of entry in a duopoly framework where two firms 
may independently improve the quality of the product they introduce to market.  
Our model is stylised, but captures some important features of innovation markets, 
including emphasising the importance of incremental innovation and allowing for 
different research streams targeted to the needs of different types of consumers.   
We derive a number of results on how entry behaviour changes as the research 
ability of the firms changes.   
Considering first the case of symmetric “research abilities”, we find that 
discontinuous changes in introduction dates can occur as we vary this parameter so 
as to move from a “pre-emptive” to a “stand alone” equilibrium.  We also observe 
differences in the social optimality of entry depending on research ability.  When 
research ability is low, follower innovations tend to be introduced too quickly— 
and have too low quality compared to the social optimum—whereas when research 
ability is high, they tend to be introduced socially too slowly.  Conversely, high 
ability leaders tend to introduce innovations too quickly and at socially too low 
quality.  Minimum quality standards can play a role in correcting this early 
movement of leaders.  Novelty requirements have a place in correcting early 
movement of followers. However, we find that even a welfare increasing novelty 
requirement does not necessarily increase the profits or investment levels of the 
initial inventor. So, stronger patent protection can hurt both leader and follower 
even if it improves welfare. The reason for this is that the stronger patent 
constrains the profits of the follower, so that the alternative to being a leader is 
worse.  As a result, firms get into a pre-emptive race to be first, which lowers 
profit and generates earlier (and hence lower quality) introduction.   This reason 
crucially depends on the fact that both the timing of entry and the identity of the 
_________________________ 
18 More detailed discussion is included within the proofs of Propositions 6 and 7 for 
specific parameter ranges and entry date rankings.  
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first mover are determined endogenously in our model, contrary to much of the 
rest of the literature on “strong” patents.  
When we allow research abilities to differ we show, like Riordan (1990), that 
higher ability firms need not be the first movers or the higher quality providers in 
the market.  Indeed, they may be either. With asymmetric firms, the effects of 
binding minimum quality standards are more complex as policy intervention can 
actually change the order of entry of the two firms. Such change has ambiguous 
welfare consequences.  If the effect is to turn a high ability firm from a follower to 
a leader, the welfare effect tends to be positive.  The welfare effect of the standard 
depends on both the level and the spread of research abilities in this case. 
Minimum quality standards are most likely to be effective if the firms are 
reasonably evenly matched in terms of research ability and if these abilities are 
either fairly limited or very high.  Novelty requirements can also change the order 
of entry and have ambiguous welfare consequences.   
The picture we draw of both minimum quality standards and novelty 
requirements is one where the effects are very industry and time specific.  This is 
not necessarily bad news for the way these instruments are applied currently.  
Indeed, many minimum quality standards are industry specific and are regularly 
revised and updated.  Our modelling generally supports this approach.  Novelty 
requirements are applied in a much more uniform manner across industries in 
theory, although there clearly is some variation across technological class in how 
the “standard” novelty requirements actually are applied.  Still, our model is less 
supportive of this approach.  Second, the picture we draw is that both policy 
instruments can have significant effect on the order of entry, the absolute level and 
the relative levels of profit across industry competitors even when only small 
adjustments in these instruments are made.  Indeed, the fact that the order of entry 
can be so strongly affected, and affects our welfare results, suggests that the 
approach of setting an exogenous order of entry in a model of novelty 
requirements may not be desirable—particularly as entry is undoubtedly 
endogenous in reality at least to some degree. 
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We begin with the proof of the results for the symmetric case.  Since the 
conditions for the existence of a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in such a set 
up have been established formally elsewhere (e.g. Dutta et al., 1995), we take the 
shortcut of conducting the analysis directly in continuous time. 
 
Sketch of proof of Lemma 1:  Deriving the time of entry of the follower 
 
Define the lag chosen by follower i in response to an entry date tj by the leader j as 
.   For a given date tj
f
ii tt −≡ϕ j, the profits of the follower depend on the time φ 





≤ ), then the quality of the follower’s product is not much higher than the 
quality of the leader’s product and both firms keep positive market shares.  In this 















> ), then the follower enjoys such a quality advantage that she serves the 





θϕπ .  












Hence, the date that maximises the follower’s profit differs, depending on whether 
we assume she waits long enough to appropriate the entire market or not.  We 
must now determine over which range of parameters φia and φib do indeed 
represent the follower’s best response to the leader’s date of entry. The first step 
consists in determining whether the argmax of each of the two profit functions 
does indeed fall within the range of φi for which the corresponding profit function 
applies. As iaπ is the correct profit function only for cia 3≤θϕ , we can substitute 
for φia to assert that φia is a candidate best response only if  cr
3<θ .  Similarly, 
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ibπ is the correct profit function only for cib 3>θϕ  so that, also by substitution, 
φib  is a candidate best response function only if  cr
2≥θ .  Note also the case that 
φai ≥ 0 if and only if cr
5.1≥θ . Hence,  if c
r
5.1<θ the follower is never willing to 
wait once the first product is introduced.  Since φia  φ≥ ib if and only if cr
4≥θ , 
we must consider three cases.  
 
Case 1:  c
r




> , the maximum of iaπ  over the range for which 








= , while the maximum 
of ibπ over θ
ϕ cib
3





πϕπ cc iaibibib => , the best 
response is ibi ϕϕ = .  Hence, for this parameter range the follower chooses to wait 












ibϕ maximises ibπ over θ
ϕ ci
2
> .  To determine the follower’s best response, we 
must compare )( iaia ϕπ and )( ibib ϕπ .  Substituting and solving, we have 










  In other words, 
for c
r
553.2>θ it is best for the follower to wait, develop a drastic innovation and 
appropriate the entire market rather than share.   For parameter ranges below this, 
the follower chooses to develop an incremental innovation and share the market 











.  Over this range, iaϕ maximises iaπ over θ
ϕ ci
3
≤ , while 
the maximum of ibπ over θ
ϕ ci
3









πϕπ cc ibiaiaia => , the best response is iai ϕϕ = .  In other words, the 
follower chooses to develop an incremental innovation over this range.  
 
 
Sketch of the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3:  (Deriving the entry time of the leader, 
tjmax, that maximises the discounted payoffs, without pre-emption and deriving the 
pre-emption date, tp)   
     
The profit function can take one of two forms during the monopoly period 
depending on whether the quality of the leader’s product makes it optimal to serve 




≤ ), then its quality is low, 





> ), the quality of the product is high enough to make it profitable to serve 
every customer.  
The profit function of the leader can also take one of two forms during the 
duopoly period, depending on whether the follower enters with a drastic 
innovation ( c
r
55.2≥θ ) or prefers to enter with a non-drastic innovation 
( c
r
55.2<θ ). Overall, then, four cases must be considered. 
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θ  for 
the range we consider here. . 
 






≤ .  This case cannot arise in equilibrium because 

































Case 3:  c
r

























































.  To see that this condition is satisfied for the range we 









.  Indeed, 











, so that tjmax must be smaller than tp 
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for low enough values of 
r
θ
, with a minimum that we will label θ  in what 





Case 4:  c
r



































Sketch of Proof of Proposition 1—the Equilibrium Entry Dates—Including 
Elements of Proposition 6 
 
We revert to a discrete time approach, where the concept of subgame perfection 
can be applied rigorously. One should therefore think of the players as choosing 
dates of introduction on a very fine discrete grid. Since the overall logic of the 
proofs for the symmetric and asymmetric cases are the same, we present them 
together.  Without loss of generality, consider the asymmetric case, where θA < θB.   B
Four critical points will be important to the proofs that follow.  First, tpA 
represents the time where the payoff to firm A from stopping—at some time, t—  
before firm B is equal to its payoff from stopping after firm B has stopped – at 
some time, t.  In other words, A would be willing to pre-empt back to this date, but 
at no earlier date.  Second, point tpB represents the time when the payoff to firm B 
from stopping before firm A is equal to its payoff from stopping after firm A has 
stopped.  In other words, this is the analogous earliest pre-emption date for firm B.  
Third, point tAmax represents the time when the payoff to firm A from stopping first 
is maximised.  Finally, point tBmax represents the time when the payoff to firm B 
from stopping first is maximised. Our first case, which we will fully develop, is 
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the case where θA < θB and  tB pA < tpB<tAmax<tBmax.  Indeed, the argument for this 
case is completely analogous to the symmetric case of tp < tmax.  We will make the 
argument for the full asymmetric case, as this can also serve to form the basis for 
Proposition 6, but keep in mind that the argument is the same as for the analogous 
symmetric case.  Of course, for the asymmetric case, we can have tpB > tAmax so 
that we have  tpA < tAmax<tpB<tBmax as well when θA < θBB .  We consider this latter 
case more briefly, below. 
If tpA<tpB<tAmax<tBmax the following is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcome for the full game, G0:  both firms wait until time tpB.   Then, firm A stops 
the R&D phase at tpB.  Firm B stops its research later, at tB*(tpB).  For the 
corresponding symmetric case where tp < tmax, there are two such outcomes that 
differ only in the identity of the firm that moves first.  In other words one firm, 
firm A (firm B) stops the R&D phase at tp, while the other, firm B (firm A) stops its 
research later at t*(tp).  These are the “pre-emption equilibrium” equilibria in the 
text.  
The argument, roughly, is that the profit function of the leader has a unique 
maximum and the profit function of the follower is decreasing in the date of 
introduction by the leader in this case.  Hence, the profits can be represented by the 
graph presented in the text for the pre-emption case.  Consider the behaviour of the 
firms up to period tAmax.  At least one firm must stop its research no later than tAmax 
from the definition of this date.  Furthermore, it is a dominant strategy for firm B 
not to stop first before time tpB since tpB is defined as the time at which the first 
mover and second mover profits are the same.  Since the first mover payoff is 
increasing over the interval from zero up to tpB, the best response of the first mover 
is to stop no earlier than tpB.  It cannot be best to stop after tpB, as we can conduct a 
thought experiment that one of the two firms could stop one period before this.  At 
this point, profits would be higher, so that the firm would do better stopping one 
period earlier.  Hence, we can “roll back” the game to tpB. Firm A stops earlier than 
B, as A would always be willing to pre-empt back to date tPA, which is before tpB. 
In the symmetric case, either firm could be the first one to pre-empt, with the other 
firm following at a later date.  Hence, for the symmetric case we have two 
equilibria, characterised by one firm stopping first at tp while the other continues 
on and stops at a later date, t*(tp).   
We can also have the case where tAmax<tBmax<tpB<tpA.  In this case, the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for the full game, G0 is that firm A moves 
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A tt ππ ≥ Bmax 




A tt ππ < max 
is smaller than tp, we will show that there are two subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcomes for the full game, G0.  In each of these, both firms wait until the time 
tmax.   One of the two firms, firm  A (firm B), stops the R&D phase at tmax while the 
other, firm B (firm A), stops its research later at tf(tmax).  These are the “stand 
alone” equilibria in the text.     
Briefly, the argument is as follows.  Let θA < θB and the ranking 
t
B
Amax<tBmax<tpB<tpA  prevail.  Then note the following:   
     Step 1:  The two firms never stop at the same date.  This follows immediately 
from Lemma 4. 
     Step 2:  tBmax < tpB.   If the game reaches tBmax, then we know that B stops from 
the definition of tBmax.  Notice that from tpB on, firm B’s dominant strategy is to 
stop since the leader’s profit is falling and the follower’s profit is less than the 
leader’s. Hence, if the game ever reaches tpB, B stops as well.  Given this, and the 
assumed ranking of dates, if consider a fine but discrete grid, at tpB – 1, A waits and 
B stops.  Further, and following similar reasoning, at tpB – 2, A waits and B stops.  
This argument can be repeated so that the game unfolds backwards until we reach 
tBmax. 
     Step 3:  For all t < tBmax, B’s dominant strategy is to wait. 
     Step 4:  Given firm B’s behaviour, firm A must essentially choose between 
moving first, in which case it maximises its payoffs by introducing at tAmax or 
moving second, in which case it will follow B’s entry date of tBmax.  In other words, 
A’s best response to B’s strategy is to move first at tAmax if 




A tt ππ ≥ Bmax otherwise.   
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  Comparison of socially optimal entry date and privately 
optimal entry date for follower:   For c
r







and appropriates the whole market (see Lemma 
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−+= , this first order condition is greater than zero so 
that .  B
s
B tt >
.     
Note that if the equilibrium is stand alone so that ],5.1[ θθ c
r
∈ , numerical 
simulations, confirm that, given an initial date of introduction, tA,  the interval 
before the second product is introduced is also too short.   
 
Proof of Proposition 3: For large parameter range, comparison of socially optimal 




rcz = .  For c
r
55.2≥θ , one gets 
)]21(
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If we have c
r
55.2≥θ , this implies that ].392.0.0[∈z   At z=0, we have 
x=0.368.  Similarly, at z=0.392, we have x=0.249.  Defining the left hand side of 
(v) as H, we can show that 0<
dz
dH
over the range considered.  Since (v) is 
satisfied at z=0,  (v) must be satisfied for z>0 as well.   
 
For smaller values of 
r
θ
 within the range we consider, however, we can have 
min[  so that the minimum quality standard would be ineffective.  
Indeed, straightforward computations indicate that both cases can occur.   
l
spAA ttt <],[ max
Note that, to be more specific about the ranges over which the leader enters too 
early or too late, we need to rely on simulations.   
Indeed, numerical simulations confirm that the entry date is too early 





. Numerical simulations show that, when  θA= θB= θ and B
c
r
c 55.219.2 ≤< θ  or c
r
804.15.1 ≤< θ , the leader enters too early.  This is not 




.   See the end of this 
appendix for the analytical results upon which these simulations were based.   
 
Proof of Proposition 4:  Range for which minimum quality standard improves 
welfare: 
 
Proposition 3 showed ranges for which the first product is introduced too early.  
Suppose that we impose a binding minimum quality standard of q θ so that the 
leader must offer no less than the socially optimal quality.  Lemma 1 has shown 
that the lag between first and second introductions is independent of the date of 




date at without affecting the quality difference between the two products.  The 




Proof of Proposition 5:  Novelty requirement can improve welfare: 
 
A novelty requirement would translate into a requirement that qA-qB > N for some 
minimum novelty requirement, N.  This can only modify behaviour if N is binding 




 Note that, for any given initial introduction date, we have 
seen in Proposition 2 that delaying entry of the follower decreases social welfare 
for c
r
55.2≥θ  and improves welfare for c
r
55.2<θ  as long as the equilibrium is 




).  Second, for any initial introduction date, 
it is clear that a larger and binding novelty requirement must decrease the 
follower’s discounted profit.  Indeed, if a pre-emption equilibrium occurs (i.e., 
θθ >
r
), this must also have the effect of speeding up the initial introduction date 
since a pre-emption equilibrium occurs when the follower is indifferent between 
moving first or second.   
We must combine these effects together to evaluate the net effect on welfare.  





date of initial introduction is independent of the delay chosen by the follower.  
Indeed, the stand alone equilibria occur at a corner solution where the leader 
decides just to serve the entire market during her period of monopoly.  It is 
because the equilibrium occurs at such a corner that a—small enough—novelty 
requirement does not affect the date of initial introduction.  The result then follows 
immediately. 
For an intermediate range where a pre-emption equilibrium occurs but where 
c
r
55.2<θ , we know first that a pre-emptive equilibrium prevails.  From the 
definition of this equilibrium, any reduction in the follower’s profit due to a 
binding novelty requirement will shift back the pre-emption date, lowering the 
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leader’s profit as well.  From Proposition 2 that the effect on the follower’s entry 
date – taken alone – has a positive welfare effect while the effect on the entry date 
of the leader need not improve welfare.   
For c
r
55.2≥θ , and replacing the optimal waiting time of the follower by N, 

















t p , as 
θ




N +≥ 1 ).   
Hence, a binding novelty requirement shifts up (i.e. to an earlier date) the date of 
entry in the pre-emption equilibrium.  We know from Proposition 3 that the pre-
emption date without a novelty requirement is already earlier than the social 
optimum.  Since, following this argument and Proposition 2, over the range 
considered we have , which is the socially optimal following 
date and we also have from this argument and Proposition 3 that  binding) 
f
s
f tNtN >=≥ )0(
Nt p (
sp tNt <=≤ )0( , a binding N must decrease welfare.   
We cannot go farther without simulations, however.  We can only say that the 
effects may go either way.  Indeed, numerical simulations show that this increases 




, while it decreases welfare above this range 




.   
 















































As the proof of this case differs trivially from the proof of Lemma 1, the proof will 
be omitted (but is available from the authors upon request).  Notice that the lag in 
introduction dates now depends on the difference in ability between the two firms.   
 
Sketch of the proofs of Propositions 6 and 7: 
 
For θA < θB, so that firm B  is the better researcher, assume that the following six 
rankings of introduction dates can occur: 
B
 
1.  maxmax BApBpA tttt <<≤  
2. maxmax BApApB tttt <≤<  
3. maxmax BpAApB tttt ≤<<  
4. maxmax BpApBA tttt ≤<<  
5. pABpBA tttt <≤< maxmax  
6. pApBBA tttt <<< maxmax  
 
(Indeed, numerical computations indicate that these are the only rankings that do, 
in fact, occur.  Hence, treating only these cases should not be viewed as 
restrictive.)   
The argument for the stand alone equilibrium (ranking 6) was presented as part 
of Proposition 1.  Now, consider briefly the case of a pre-emption equilibrium, so 
that either the first or the second ranking, above, prevails.  Here, it could be the 
case that firm A introduces first at time tpB (if ranking 1 prevails) or that firm B 
introduces first at time tpA (if ranking two prevails).  The proof for the first ranking 
is presented as part of the proof of Proposition 1.  In other words, recall that we 
proved that case for an assumption of asymmetric abilities, stating that the 
symmetric case was analogous.  The proof for the second ranking is analogous to 
the case of the first ranking and so it, too, is omitted for brevity.   
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Given this, proceed to the application of a minimum quality standard.  We can 
find cases for both types of equilibria where the minimum quality standard 
changes the order of entry.   
Consider the stand alone case first, that of ranking 6 and recall that in this case 
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is that firm A moves first at tAmax 




A tt ππ ≥ Bmax if and only 
if .  A minimum quality standard can change the order of 
moves in this case.    Consider the case where firm A introduces first in 
equilibrium.  Define  such that .  Any minimum quality 










A tt ππ =
'tAθ  but no greater than maxBBtθ  would make firm A’s 




min  lower than its profits as a follower, 
changing the equilibrium outcome to one where firm B introduces first.  For 
minimum quality requirements larger than maxBBtθ , firm B wants to introduce first 
as soon as it can meet the standard.  Since θB > θB A, firm A cannot meet the quality 
requirement as early as firm B and cannot, therefore, prevent firm B from 




min .  Hence, a strengthening of the minimum quality standard 
can induce a change in leadership from the less to the more skilled researcher in 
this case.  Moreover, as the stand alone entry date is smaller than the social 
optimum, the optimal minimum quality requirement is always large enough to 
reverse the order in which the two firms introduce their products in this case.     
In an equilibrium for ranking 1 (where a pre-emptive equilibrium prevails), 
recall that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is that firm A 
introduces first at date tpB.  If the minimum quality standard, qmin, is binding, we 
must, then, have qmin > θAtpB, so that firm A cannot introduce until after tpB.  After 
tpB, firm B prefers to move first.  Since firm B will always be able to satisfy the 
minimum quality requirement before firm A (because we have assumed that θA < 
θB) , it will indeed move first. B
Since the proofs for cases 3, 4, and 5 of the rankings of entry times, above, are 
almost identical.  Consider, then, only ranking 4 and apply the minimum quality 
standard.  The more efficient firm, firm B, moves first ( ).  The pBc tt ≥
www.economics-ejournal.org 45 
 
unconstrained equilibrium is such that firm B moves first at tc-1 .  As such, 
any minimum quality standard q
pBt≥
min  θ≤ Atc is ineffective since it does not prevent 
firm A from credibly threatening to introduce first at tc. For 1min −≤< cAcA tqt θθ , 
firm A can only credibly threaten to stop at tc-1 so that firm B introduces first at tc-1-
1.  Following the same reasoning, one can see that greater values of qmin induce 
later dates of first introduction by B in a stepwise fashion.  Now let 
maxmin BApAA tqt θθ ≥< . Firm A cannot introduce before tpA (since the minimum 





If maxmin BAtq θ>   then firm A cannot introduce before tBmax (since the minimum 
quality standard does not allow it).  Hence, we have a stand alone equilibrium 
where firm A introduces first at tBmax.   
On the other hand, we have that when tc< tpB, firm A introduces first at tAmax in 
the unconstrained equilibrium.  Define  as the largest t*it i which is still smaller 
than tpB and  as the smallest t* 1−it i which is larger than tpB.  The earliest date at 
which firm B will want to introduce first is .  Therefore, any minimum 
quality requirement such that  just pushes back the date of 
firm A’s introduction to 
1* 1 −−it
*




min .  For , however, firm A prefers 
to let firm B introduce first at  and the minimum quality requirement reverses 
the order of introduction.  For even larger minimum quality requirements, the 









Sketch of Analytical Results Used to Establish Results from Numerical 
Simulations 
 
To perform the numerical computations we must determine timax, tp and . lst
  








max > so that the whole market is served during the initial 





















−= 1 .  (For large enough values of 
r
θ
 this is indeed greater than 
θ
c2




































For the range of values we consider here, this exceeds
θ
c2
 . This is a contradiction.  




max =  must hold for the range for which stand alone 









Assuming that tp 
θ
c2




















































Which is greater than 
θ
c2














which is satisfied for all c
r
5.1>θ .  
 
 
4. Comparison of the Different Stopping Times 
Based on steps 1, 2 and 3, above, for θθ <
r




>  = timax so that 







, a minimum quality 
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standard of is called for in this range.  For lstθ r
θθ ≤ we have a pre-emptive 
















but this holds, indeed, for this range.  Hence, we have a pre-emption equilibrium 
over this range.  Indeed, computations show that the pre-emptive equilibrium 
occurs earlier than tsl —so that a minimum quality standard is desirable—if and 
only if θθ ≤
r
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